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EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE SCIENCES IN THE 
EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY. Edited by H. N. Jahnke and M. 
Otte. Boston (Reidel). 1981. 420 pp. 
Reviewed by Joan L. Richards 
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853 
This book is a collection of papers brought together after 
an interdisciplinary conference held at Bielefeld in November 
1979. The focus of the conference was science and culture in 
the transitional period from the 18th century to the 19th cen- 
tury. The initial interest was in the development of mathema- 
tics, but the organizers "soon realized that a broader approach 
encompassing all the scientific disciplines in their interdisci- 
plinary relations and their relations to other areas of knowledge 
and social and cultural development would be more appropriate 
to that particular historical period" (p. xii). The papers 
which resulted are grouped into three major sections: "Science 
0315-0860/82/020239-14$02.00/O 
Copyright 0 1982 by Academic Press, Inc. 
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 
240 Reviews HM 9 
around 1800: Cognitive and Social Change," "Science and Educa- 
tion," "Mathematics in the Early 19th Century"; they are pre- 
ceded by a comprehensive editorial introduction. 
It is difficult to characterize further the papers loosely 
grouped under these section headings. Even within headings 
the subjects are highly diverse: The first includes papers 
with titles ranging from "On Science as a Language" to "Onto- 
logic Foundation of Scientific Knowledge in Seventeenth- and 
Eighteenth-Century Rationalism" to "The Prussian Professoriate 
and the Research Imperative, 1790-1840." Rather than attempt 
a review SO broad as to encompass them all, I consider primarily 
those papers in the final, mathematical, section. 
Even within this restricted section, the heterogeneity of 
the essays focuses attention on the editors' Introduction for 
guidance in coordinating them. In this opening essay Jahnke, 
Otte, and Schminnes hoped to provide both “some key words and 
concepts useful for further scholarly work" and "methodological 
orientations for the investigation of . . . a very peculiar period 
in the history of science [the early nineteenth century]."(xi) 
Unfortunately their effort does, as the authors feared it might, 
seem "programmatic and summary" (p. xi). The attempt to pro- 
vide "key VTords and concepts" seems to amount to little more 
than coining words and phrases such as "methodolization" and 
"theorization of knowledge" whose function, beyond rendering 
the piece opaque, is doubtful. But the "methodological orien- 
tations," the authors suggest, carry some important implications 
for the history of science. 
The authors contend that scientific development in the 
transitional period of the French revolution was intrinsically 
bound up with its cultural context. The relationship they 
describe is a dialectical one in which external cultural 
forces and internal methodological ones are constantly being 
balanced within the development of scientific theory. Their 
particular focus is on eduation, which they feel is not only 
a field where the relations between scientific knowledge and 
the larger culture are made explicit, but is also at the fore- 
front of the ongoing exploration and development of those rela- 
tions. In his dual role as scholar and teacher, the educator 
must continually examine the ways his subject fits into the 
society for which he is educating his students. His position 
as interpreter of science for his culture leads him to formalize 
the methodology of his research and make it explicit. Thus, 
the editors contend, much of the motive force behind detailed 
examinations of scientific methodology comes from education. 
Further, they find in educational writings concrete expression 
of the cultural influences hidden in scientific development. 
Educational writings thus serve both as an expression and an 
exemplar of the complex dialectic the authors claim exists 
between cultural and scientific development. 
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The editors support their claim that educational thinking 
contains an important clue to the nature of mathematical devel- 
opment in the early 19th century with both theoretical and 
historical argument. The theoretical argument is very abstract 
and seems partially grounded on a sophisticated pun on the term 
"formal" which allows unqualified movement from "formal educa- 
tion" to "formal mathematics." It is perhaps intriguing but 
is at best marginally persuasive. 
The historical basis of the claim is also highly suspect. 
The editors rest it on two observations. On the one hand, 
they contend that in the early 19th century "Mathematics was 
(apart from chemistry) the one science that underwent the most 
comprehensive change of its methods and style." On the other 
hand, they note, "in the curricular debate, the status of math- 
ematics was particularly controversial" (p. xxii). In addition 
to these simultaneities the editors rely on an isolated para- 
graph quoting from Martin Ohm's textbooks to substantiate the 
kinds of relations they contend existed between these areas. 
Without considerably more evidence and background information, 
this argument is hardly persuasive. 
Although the evidence given for the claims that science 
and society develop through a mutual dialectic and that edu- 
cation is the place where the interaction is best expressed 
is weak, not all of the blame lies with the authors. They 
are attempting to theorize in the face of a real gap in the 
historical literature. Except for some recent biographical 
studies, the bulk of the literature, dealing comprehensively 
with the history of mathematics, has not explored the possi- 
bility that mathematics could have been culturally influenced. 
Similarly histories of culture generally proceed on the premise 
that except for technological advances, the development of 
mathematics has played virtually no role in culture at large. 
There are very few historical studies which have explored the 
grounds of possible interaction in detail. 
Lacking a body of specifically relevant historical studies, 
those contemplating essential relations between mathematics and 
society are forced either to be totally theoretical or to com- 
bine material from histories of mathematics with material from 
cultural histories. However, connections drawn in this manner 
are at best hypothetical. Therefore, there is a pressing need 
for historical studies attempting to document specific connec- 
tions between social and scientific developments. Whatever 
conclusions are reached about the validity of the authors' 
speculations must be bolstered by careful new historical work. 
Judging from the essays collected in this volume, however, 
one cannot but doubt whether mathematical historians are per- 
forming this important task. The authors of the six papers 
collected in the secion "Mathematics in the Early 19th Century" 
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seem in varying degrees uncomfortable with the attempt to con- 
nect the internal development of mathematics with its ambient 
culture. On the whole, they skirt the fundamental connections 
between mathematical theory and sociological practice the ed- 
itors assert must exist. Although this failure is disappointing 
it is hard to determine whether it indicates that the kind of 
integrating model conceived by the editors is not viable, or 
that historians of mathematics are not quite able to get a 
handle on the historical problems it suggests. 
That there are virtually no significant cultural influences 
in mathematical development is the view which has long dominated 
the history of mathematics. It has been supported by at least 
two arguments--one epistemological, the other functional. Each 
argument is represented by one paper in the mathematical section 
of this book. 
The epistemological view is represented by Judith Grabiner 
in the conclusion to her study of Lagrange. In closing she 
notes that "the influence of external forces on mathematics is 
at best subtle and occasionally negligible," although in some 
cases "even the technical history of mathematics cannot be 
fully understood without attention to non-mathematical condi- 
tions" (p. 325). The connections she traces between Lagrange's 
work and the ambient society are not strong enough to shake her 
conviction that mathematics is an essentially self-contained 
study impenetrable to social influences. In her words, "math- 
ematical ideas . . . have a life of their own" (p. 325). 
The kind of internally focused history engendered by the 
conviction that mathematical development is intrinsically 
independent of social factors has recently been supported by 
a slightly different argument, which I have labeled functional. 
This argument rests on the claim that the function of the history 
of mathematics is to widen the mathematical acquaintance of 
modern mathematicians. The basic goal of introducing present 
practitioners to their historical colleagues presupposes that 
all factors which might obscure the easy collegiality are ir- 
relevant. Thus, this perception of the purpose of mathematical 
history dictates that any cultural artifacts which lurk in the 
work of mathematicians of the past must be exorcised. Histori- 
cal figures are interesting only insofar as they are like their 
20th-century counterparts. 
In the first paragraph of his paper, "The Origins of Pure 
Mathematics," Winfried Scharlau allies himself with Andre Weil, 
a principal proponent of the functional view. In considering 
early-19th-century mathematics Scharlau argues basically that 
its strength was inversely related to its extra-mathematical 
entanglements. All of his explanations for mathematical growth 
are strictly internal. Thus, he attributes the strength of 
early-19th-century mathematics to its increasing independence 
from German idealism; the interest in foundations is attributed 
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not to education but to the fact that "they presented many dif- 
ficult and interrelated unsolved problems" (p. 338); and, fin- 
ally, the origin of pure mathematics lies in "the fact that . . . 
a large number of conections were discovered between seemingly 
different problem areas and results" (p. 339). The historical 
basis for these conclusions is unfortunately as general and 
inadequate as that of the "Introduction." (The author admits, 
"I can only contribute an informal discussion of this vast area 
of study and . . . many important historical points . . . will be 
only fleetingly touched upon" (p. 331).) Hence it is of little 
help in exploring the middle historical ground between mathe- 
matics and culture, even as a demonstration of its lack of 
importance. 
Other essays in this section are more sociologically or 
culturally oriented than Scharlau's. They appear at least to 
be preliminary attempts to study the interactions between the 
development of early-19th-century mathematical theory and its 
surrounding culture. Their conclusions are not generally as 
tentative about the importance of such studies as Grabiner's. 
And yet, the details of the connections which might exist be- 
tween the cultural context and the content of mathematical 
knowledge are for the most part lacking. 
For example, Joseph Dauben's chronicle of the institutional 
rise of mathematics in Berlin emphasizes that an indigenous 
school of mathematics grew up there which borrowed heavily 
from the French, but was also strongly influenced by German 
Idealism. However, he stops short of defining what he means 
by German Idealism and the ways its influence was felt in 
German mathematics. The need for specificity in claiming such 
a relation is particularly underlined in this case, as Scharlau 
claims (equally vaguely) that an important factor in modern 
mathematical development was just its freedom from German Ideal- 
ism. Are Dauben and Scharlau supporting two different historical 
claims or referring to two different "German Idealisms"? De- 
tailed specific studies encompassing the works of both the rele- 
vant philosophers and mathematicians are necessary to clarify 
this kind of question. 
Although Dauben's conclusion is too broad to establish the 
connections he claims, the body of the paper, like the paper 
of Herbert Mehrtens, is a valuable first step toward documenting 
and clarifying the institutional circumstances of German mathe- 
maticians in the first few decades of the century. Mehrtens, 
who examines the institutional status of German mathematics in 
the first decades of the 19th century, closes his paper with 
the observation "... one may ask whether this period did not 
. . . accomplish much of the basic epistemological reorientation 
necessary to set the stage for the coming renaissance of German 
mathematics" (p. 416). One may indeed ask, but the fundamental 
issue of how social organization can have significant epistem- 
ological effects is unanswered. 
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Whereas Dauben and Mehrtens consider the institutional side 
of this issue, Ivor Grattan-Guinness goes a step further in his 
classification of early-19th-century French mathematicians. 
Rather than contenting himself with institutional positions, 
he tries to analyze the mathematical community according to 
the nature of their work. Classifying mathematicians along 
such elusive lines as mathematical style and foundational pre- 
suppositions, Grattan-Guinness describes several trends in 
early-19th-century French mathematics. However he stops short 
of venturing either sociological or any other explanations for 
various clearly demarcated groups. This kind of study may 
eventually serve as a basis for others who want to specify 
fully the nature of connections between epistemological and 
social structures. As it stands now, however, such specula- 
tions still lie in the future. 
The single paper which draws well-documented and clear 
connections between mathematical and cultural development is 
Lorraine Daston's "Mathematics and the Moral Sciences: The 
Rise and Fall of the Probability of Judgements, 1785-1840." 
Here the author explores in detail relationships between 
psychological theories, legal assumptions, social developments, 
and work in the probability of judgments. Her presentation of 
the particular ways in which these strains of thought inter- 
acted over a seventy-five year period could begin to lend 
concrete substance to the speculations of general theorists 
like the editors. Ironically, Daston's paper does not bear 
on the major themes of mathematical development and education 
around which the conference was organized. Thus, save for 
suggesting the need for a more comprehensive model of mathema- 
tical and cultural interaction, it gives only general support 
to the editors' central thesis. 
In reading this book the many defects of the volume, as cur- 
rently brought together, repeatedly distract the reader. The 
essays range from detailed polished pieces to broad, informal 
disquisitions, and to what can best be described as suggestive 
notes. The diversity of the papers, and hence the difficulty 
of moving through the book, is exacerbated by loose editing. 
The footnote and bibliographic conventions vary not only from 
article to article, but sometimes within a single article as 
well. While all but one of the articles appear in English 
(one wonders why there is a lone exception here), some of the 
translations are awkward and hard to read. The most irritating 
problem seems to have arisen from the fact that the proofs were 
not sent to the authors for their corrections. Serious typo- 
graphical errors pepper the articles. Thus, as selected exam- 
@es, Grabiner's conclusion is marred by what seems to be the 
omission of a "not," and there is a blank in Grattan-Guinness' 
paper for the point around which exp (-l/x2) (one assumes that 
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the l/x2 given in the text is also a typographical error) does 
not take a series expansion. Despite these shortcomings, this 
book raises increasingly pressing issues of real importance 
for historians of mathematics. For that reason, it is worth 
some attention. 
IT SEEMS I AM A JEW. By Grigori Freiman. Translated, edited, 
and with an introduction by Melvyn B. Nathanson, Carbondale 
(Southern Illinois University Press). 1980. 97 pp. $9.95 
Reviewed by Yakov Rabkin 
Universitk de Montdal, Montdal, Canada 
Science has been steadily losing its political innocence, 
mainly with respect to the technological consequences of scien- 
tific research. The book under review exposes political and 
ethnic aspects both of the scientific activity itself and of 
recruitment into the scientific profession. The author shows 
how mathematical talent and human indecency can happily coexist 
for quite a number of scientists. In spite of this damning 
evidence, Grigori Freiman is by no means a radical critic of 
science. He is an enthusiastic teacher and researcher who has 
devoted all his life to what he likes best: mathematics. It 
may be a modest goal to do mathematics, but obstacles on the 
way to that goal were legion for the author and his fellow Jews. 
This book is a detailed, very convincing account of how and why 
these obstacles were erected in Soviet science. To an American 
reader it offers a thought-provoking picture of what affirmative 
action h la russe can bring about in science when implemented 
without significant resistance from society. 
\ 
Soviet authorities have been consistently concerned about 
equal representation of the country's ethnic groups in science 
as well as in other prestigious activities. With time, however, 
this "noble" concern has turned into a pervasive discriminatory 
practice directed mainly against the Jews, the only major "non- 
rooted" people in the Soviet ethnic mosaic. "Non-rootedness" 
is a peculiar Soviet concept denoting an ethnic group without 
a language or a territory. In contradistinction to the Kazakhs 
or the Kirghiz, the Jews are a "non-rooted" ethnic group whose 
ethnicity is determined by the authorities; it appears on the 
official papers of every Soviet Jew, independently of the wishes 
of the bearer. Since ethnic quotas were used by the Czarist 
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